Causal determinism—the thesis that for any given time, a complete description of the state of the world
at that time, together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth or state of affairs
as to what happens after that time.

Indeterminism—some events do not have causes. Two types: metaphysical indeterminism is about the
way the world is or is not, and epistemological indeterminism is about our knowledge of the world. These
two types may align, but not necessarily.

Incompatibilist—accepts that if causal determinism is true, there is no genuine human freedom.
    Hard Determinist—accepts that causal determinism is true, and thus there is no genuine freedom.
    Libertarian—accepts that if causal determinism is true, there is no genuine human freedom.
        However, causal determinism is false, thus there might be or is human freedom.

Compatibilist—denies that if causal determinism is true, there is no genuine freedom.
    Soft Determinist—accepts causal determinism but denies that there is no genuine human freedom.

Fatalism—1. There exists a set of statements describing everyone’s future behavior all of which are now
true (even if we don’t know them) and 2) since these statements are now true, the behavior they describe
is unavoidable—people cannot do other that what they will do. A fatalist need not be a causal determinist
because there may be uncaused events in the future.

Forking Paths Model versus the Deterministic Model—the forking paths reflect a freedom of choice, i.e,
at each choice one can go either of two ways.  The deterministic model does not have these forks and
thus is best represented as a single path in one direction.

Consequence Argument—If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up
to us what the laws of nature are. Thus, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are
not up to us.

Moral Responsibility—The consequence argument shows that if things are not up to us, neither are the
consequences of them. If determinism is true, then we are not morally responsible for our actions—because
they are not up to us, nor are we responsible for the consequences. If determinism is false, we may be
morally responsible because our actions may be up to us and we may responsible for some consequences.

INTEPRETATION:

I take Epictetus to have a unique position, one like a modern day philosopher, Harry Frankfurt. Epictetus
wants to argue that determinism can be true, yet one is still morally responsible in some instances.
Frankfurt argues through a higher-order account of volitions that is quite amenable to Epictetus. There
are at least two orders of desire, first-order and second-order. First order desires, “I am hungry; I want to
go home, etc..” Second order desires, “I desire to want to eat; I desire to want to go home.” Thus, second
order desires are about first-order desires. Someone has a desire of the second-order either:

   1) when he wants simply to have a certain desire.
   2) when he wants a certain desire to be his will.

Frankfurt calls #2, a second-order volition—a desire that can lead someone to action. A person who
enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. It is in securing the
conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will.
When the will and second-order volitions do not align, a person feels the lack of the freedom.
The enjoyment of a free will means the satisfaction of certain desires—desires of the second or of
higher-orders—whereas its absence means their frustration

Back to Epictetus. He is constantly concerned with aligning his will with the plan of nature, see 4,
29, 31, and 49. Yet notice, he often mentions things that are up to us, and things that are not. You
can choose how the externals affect you; thus, it seems that you are not completely determined in
all respects. You can be morally responsible for your actions when they don’t comport with nature.
The implicit premise here for Epictetus is that living a virtuous life is one that aligns with the function
and goal of nature. Thus if you are not aligning your life with nature, you are not living a virtuous life.
I think Epictetus is best described as a compatibilist—we are both free and determined, but not in
the same respects.  When our will aligns with nature, we are free, when it does not, we are not.

From our readings in Epictetus, we know that some things are up to us or under our control, and some
things are not up to us, or not under our control. Translating this into the terminology of the Free Will
handout would result in something like the following:

If every single thing is not under our control, we call that causal determinism.

If every single thing is under our control, we call that libertarianism.

If some things are under our control and some things are not, we call that compatibilism.

If some things are under our control or some things are not, we call that incompatibilism.
    One or the other must be true or they must both be false.

The Paradise Island Scenario

One of the main implications of this scenario is to show that we may have an appearance of free will,
yet all of our actions are determined. Notice the shift in perspectives: from the subjective perspective
you wouldn’t know but from an objective perspective, i.e. a God’s eye view, you would know.

A few questions to think about:

1. Do you think it is possible to have an illusion of free will, yet be determined much like the
    Paradise Island scenario?

2. If lacking free will on PI bothers you, what value is missing? Choice, the ability to be self-directed or ?

3. Is there something defective in the relationships on PI? For example, what would it mean for someone
    to be your ‘friend’ if all of the relationships are determined?

4. How would your conception of yourself change if you knew you had no free will? Or would it? For
    example, if you were not free to choose your spouse what would that say about what you want?

5. Does Epictetus’ general idea that some things are up to us and others are not convince you that
    compatibilism might be true or the correct formulation?