I. The Problem of Death.

If we believe that death is the permanent end of our conscious existence, is it a bad thing?

“”If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is
    a bad thing to die.”(1)

II. Two possible positions.

A. Death deprives of us life which is essential quality we all we have. Therefore, it is the greatest of all
    losses because we lose something essential to our being.

“..life is all we have and the loss of it is the greatest loss we can sustain.”(1)
 
B. Death is the end of the subject. It is a mere blank, without a positive or negative value. There is no
    subject left to experience the value.

“ …and that if we realize that death is not an unimaginable condition of the persisting person, but a mere
    blank, we will see that it can have no value whatever, positive or negative.”(1)

III. Definitions

A. Death—permanent death, unsupplemented by any form of conscious survival.

B. Evil—deprivation of some quality or characteristic.

IV. If death is an evil, it is not because of its positive features, but because of what it deprives us of.
    Namely, the essential quality of life.

A. Life has value apart from its contents. When we take away all the good and bad experiences in life
    what is left over, the bare experience of life, is valuable in itself.

“There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life better; there are other elements
which, if added to one’s experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is
not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive…The additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself,
rather than by any of its contents.”(2)

1. The value of life does not attach to mere organic survival. Surviving in a coma does not appeal to us as a
    form of living.

2. The good of life can be multiplied by time. More is better than less. The quantities need not be
    continuous. Much like Camus point about the quantity versus quality of experiences.

B. The state of being dead, or nonexistent, is not evil in itself. It cannot be what makes death bad.

“…But if death is an evil, it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or non-existent, or
    unconscious, that is objectionable.” (3)

1. Death is not an evil that one accumulates more of the longer one is dead.

“Death, however, is not an evil of which Shakespeare has so far received a larger portion than Proust.
    If death is a disadvantage, it is not easy to say when a man suffers it.” (3)

2. We would not regard a temporary suspension of life as a great misfortune in itself.

“If it ever happens that people can be frozen without reduction of the conscious lifespan, it will be
    inappropriate to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation.” (3)

3. We don't regard the long period of time before we were born, in which we did not exist, as a great misfortune.

“…none of existed before we were born (or conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune.” (3)

V. Three objections.

A. It can be doubted that anything can be an evil unless it causes displeasure. How can a deprivation of
    life be an evil unless someone minds the deprivation?

B. In the case of death there is no subject left. How can it be a misfortune if there is no subject of the
        misfortune? Who suffers the misfortune?

C. How can the period of nonexistence after our death be bad, if  the period before our birth is not bad?

VI. Replies to the objections.

A. The good or ill fortune of a person depends on a person’s history and possibilities rather than just their
    momentary state. Therefore a terrible misfortune can befall a person even though they are not around to
    experience the misfortune.

 “Often we need to know his history to tell whether something is a misfortune or not; this applies to ills
    like deterioration, deprivation and damage. Sometimes his experiential state is relatively unimportant
    —as in the case of a man who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit of a method of communicating
    with asparagus plants.”(5)
 

1. We consider ourselves to have been injured when  someone acts against our wishes or interests, even
                  when we are not aware of his or her actions.
 
  “Loss, betrayal, deception, and ridicule are on this view bad because people suffer when they learn
    of  them.”(5)

2. The discovery of wrongs done us in our absence make us unhappy because they are misfortunes.
    They are not misfortunes only because they made us unhappy when we discovered them.

  “For the natural view is that the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy  because it is bad to be
    betrayed—not that betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy.”(5)

3. We consider a person who has suffered a severe brain injury, to have a grave misfortune, even
    though they may be quite happy in their new condition. We recognize this only when we consider
    the person he could be now.

   “Such a development would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only for his friends and
  relations, or for society, but also, and primarily for the person himself….there is some doubt, in fact,
  whether he can be said to exist any longer.” (5-6)

B. Although the person as a subject does not survive his or her death, it can still be the subject of the
    misfortune. If he or she had not died, it would have gone on enjoying whatever good there is in living.

“He has lost his life, and if he had not died, he would have continued to live it, and to possess whatever
    good there is in living.”(7)

C. The period of time after death is time that death deprives us of. This is not true of the period of non-existence
before birth. This explains the differences in our attitudes towards these two periods of non-existence.

“Therefore any death entails the loss of some life that its victim would have led had he not died at that or any
    earlier point. We know perfectly well what it would be for him to have had it instead of losing it, and there
    is no difficulty in identifying the loser.” (8)

D. The direction of time is important.

“Distinct possible lives of a single person can diverge from a common beginning, but they cannot converge to
a common conclusion from diverse beginnings. (The latter would represent not a set of different possible lives
of one individual, but a set of distinct set of possible individuals, whose lives have identical conclusions.) Given
an identifiable individual, countless possibilities for his continued existence are imaginable, and we can clearly
conceive of what it would be for him to go on existing indefinitely. However inevitable it is that this will not come
about, its possibility is still that of the continuation of a good for him, if life is the good we take it to be.” (8)

VII. The question still remains whether the non-realization of the possibility for further life is always a misfortune,
    or whether this depends on what can naturally be hoped for.

A. Perhaps we can only regard as a misfortune those deprivations which add gratuitously to the inevitable evils
    we must endure. In this case, only premature death would be a great evil.

 “Even if we can dispose of the objections against admitting misfortune that is not experienced, or cannot be
    assigned to a definite time in that person’s life, we still have to set some limits on how possible a possibility
    must be for its non-realization to be a misfortune (or good fortune, should the possibility be a bad one).
    The death of Keats at 24 is generally regarded as tragic, that of Tolstoy at 82 is not. Although they will both
    be dead forever, Keat’s death deprived him of many years of life which were allowed to Tolstoy; so in a clear
    sense Keat’s loss was greater.”(9)

B. Whether we see death as a deprivation depends upon the point of view we take up.  Nagel’s point is whether
    or not we consider something from a personal or impersonal point of view.
 
1. Observed from the outside, objectively, a human being cannot live much more than 100 years. From this
    point of view, we can only feel deprived of those years which are allotted to beings of our type, but which
    we do not live long enough to enjoy.

  This is an impersonal POV. Remember the Tolstoy and Keats example.

2. When looked at in terms of our own experience, subjectively, our life experience seems open ended. We
can see no reason why our normal experiences cannot continue indefinitely. On this view death, no matter
how inevitable, is the cancellation of an indefinitely extendible good. The fact that death is inevitable does not
affect how it feels in our experience to look forward to the end of our experience.

This is a personal POV.

“If there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in
    store for us all.” (10)